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In this paper, I use difference-in-differences regressions to measure how the debt tax shield 
affects the capital structure of a company. By comparing the financial leverage of treatment 
and control companies before and after the introduction of an equity tax shield, I infer the 
impact of the tax discrimination between debt and equity. Consistent with the theoretical 
prediction, the  estimated results show that  the introduction of an equity tax shield has a 
significant negative effect on the financial leverage of a company. This effect amounts to 
approximately 2-7%, meaning that a classical tax system encourages companies to use on 
average 2-7% more debt than when there is an equal tax treatment of debt and equity. 
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Edoardo Traversa, Joann Weiner and from helpful comments by the participants to the LSM 
PhD Meeting and UCL Economics Doctoral Workshop. 1 Introduction
Twenty years ago MacKie-Mason (1990) raised the question whether taxes aﬀect corporate ﬁnancing
decisions. After decades of research strong evidence answering this question was still not found. Based
on Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)’s work, Stiglitz (1973) and King (1974) focused on the tax dis-
crimination between debt and equity and theoretically showed that the cost of capital is dependent on
the mode of ﬁnancing, if tax diﬀerentials exist between those modes. Their work triggered an important
number of studies, empirically testing the ﬁnding and measuring the impact of the unequal tax treatment
of ﬁnancing modes on a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial decisions. Early research work tried in vain to ﬁnd empirical
support for this theoretical result (a.o. Marsh (1982), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz
(1985), Titman and Wessels (1988)). It was suggested that the use of debt was inﬂuenced more by its
other non-tax functions, such as a signal of ﬁrm quality, an antitakeover device or a means of restricting
managerial discretion, than by its related tax advantage (see Harris and Raviv (1990) for a literature
review). Those studies which found evidence that the tax beneﬁts of debt inﬂuence a company’s capital
structure (a.o. MacKie-Mason (1990), Graham (2000), Gordon and Lee (2001)), needed to assume re-
strictive conditions to measure the impact of the tax beneﬁts of debt in an accurate way. MacKie-Mason
(1990), for instance, limited his sample to less proﬁtable companies to ﬁnd evidence that taxation impacts
a company’s debt policy. He found that a one-standard-deviation increase in a non-debt tax shield, e.g.
depreciation and investment tax credits, reduces the percentage of debt issues by about 10 percentage
points. Graham (2000) uses simulation methods for the period 1980-1994 to show that the tax beneﬁt of
debt amounts to about 9-10% of ﬁrm value. Moreover, a large strand of this literature uses diﬀerences
in marginal tax rates to measure the impact of tax shields, in order to cope with the limited variation
in accessible tax variables.
By using a diﬀerent approach for studying the impact of taxation on capital structure, this paper
provides signiﬁcant evidence of how tax beneﬁts inﬂuence corporate ﬁnancial decision-making. The
paper goes back to the experimental ideal for evaluating the impact of taxes on corporate debt policy,
i.e. analyzing a tax system which attributes a similar tax deductibility to the return on equity as the
generally implemented deductibility for interest expenses on debt. As such, tax neutrality between the
two sources of ﬁnance is ensured and corporate taxation no longer favors debt over equity. Such a tax
system is based on the theoretical concept of a neutral "pure proﬁts" tax as developed by Boadway and
Bruce (1984). They advocate to tax only the returns on investment above the costs of capital, which
requires to tax the sources of ﬁnance equally. Devereux and Freeman (1991) suggested to put this idea
into practice by providing companies with an ’Allowance for Corporate Equity’(ACE), i.e. an equity
tax relief. Empirical testing of this theoretical system, however, was until now not possible due to a
lack of faithful implementation of all aspects of this tax feature or due to a lack of relevant data. The
introduction of the tax deductibility of equity costs in Belgium in 2006, oﬀers the experimental ideal for
testing how tax beneﬁts aﬀect the capital structure of a company. Unlike other implementations, this
equity tax reform includes most of the basic and powerful features of the theoretical taxation system as
developed by Devereux and Freeman (1991) and therefore, approaches tax neutrality very closely. As a
result the studied tax shield is labeled ’full’ system versus ’partial’ systems. Since all of the latter systems
are guided by diﬀerent rules, studies related to those systems did not allow to draw a general conclusion
about the system’s impact (o.a. Staderini (2001), Klemm (2007))1. In addition to a diﬀerent approach
of the topic, this paper oﬀers the beneﬁt of analyzing a large dataset, as the tax reform automatically
applies to all companies ﬁling a corporate tax return in the country. Moreover, as the equity tax shield
1Other countries in and outside the EU (Croatia (1994), Brazil (1996), Italy (1997) and Austria (2000)) chose
to introduce an Allowance for Corporate Equity, although they implemented the system diﬀerently. Croatia
included most of the features of the theoretical tax as developed by Devereux and Freeman (1991). Brazil limited
the application of the system to dividends paid out to shareholders instead of applying it to the total amount of
equity as suggested by the theoretical model. Italy and Austria lowered the tax rate on equity returns but did not
exempt them from taxation. The empirical studies evaluating those ACE systems are not unanimously convincing.
Keen and King (2002) analyze the Croatian implementation of ACE, but do not have the necessary data to study
the impact of the Croatian system on the leverage of companies. Klemm (2007) studied Brazilian data and noted
no signiﬁcant change of the capital structure of Brazilian companies. Staderini (2001) analyzed the impact of the
Italian system and found, however, that the leverage of companies decreased following the introduction of the
system. Based on these results, it is hard to conclude on the system’s eﬃciency. An explanation, however, could
be that altering basic and powerful characteristics of the theoretical proposition and hence the implementation of
a partial ACE system, was not an eﬃcient choice. Three countries, Croatia, Italy and Austria, decided to abolish
the system few years after its introduction. In Croatia and Austria, the desire to cut the overall corporate tax
rate most probably explains the decision to eliminate the system.
1studied in this paper was only introduced in 2006, some theoretical studies (Gerard (2006a), Gerard
(2006b)) but few empirical analyses studying its capital structure implications are available so far.
I develop a simple model to show what changes the introduction of an equity tax shield is expected
to produce. The model predicts that further to equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity, a
company lowers its debt ratio. To quantitatively test this prediction and in order to measure the impact
of taxation on corporate ﬁnancing decisions, I use in this paper a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation
strategy, comparing the capital structure of treatment and control companies before and after the tax
reform. Belgian ﬁrms are considered the treatment companies; French ﬁrms play the role of control
companies. The data related to the period 2001-2005 are the pre-treatment data; those related to
the period 2006-2007 the post-treatment data. The sample includes individual company information
of 3,332 treatment companies and 17,100 control companies. In order to ascertain the comparability
of both groups of companies, capital structure trends are analyzed and a propensity score method is
applied to match treatment and control ﬁrms. Consistent with the theoretical prediction set out in the
model, the empirical results provide considerable evidence of a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the equity
tax shield on the leverage of a company. This means that the debt tax shield, proper to a traditional
tax system, aﬀects a company’s capital structure. The main results are robust to several robustness
tests. By generating the same analysis for a diﬀerent control group (26,241 German companies), I assess
whether the results are not country-speciﬁc. For both control groups, I ﬁnd that the estimated impact is
highly signiﬁcant and that it amounts economically to a leverage ratio decrease of approximately 2-7%.
Further extension of the analysis reveals that, consistent with the ﬁnancial constraint theory, the capital
structure of large companies is more aﬀected by the introduction of an equal tax treatment of debt and
equity than the capital structure of small and medium enterprises.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the institutional background and the principal
characteristics of the tax reform. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the
empirical methodology and shows how it applies to the introduction of an equity tax shield. Section 4
describes the data set and presents the construction of an adequate control group. Section 5 discusses
the main results, produces some robustness checks and considers some further extensions of the analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
Belgian corporate tax rules can be considered as a traditional tax system (Graham (2003)). Companies
are taxed on their proﬁts, i.e. the business income less the costs to generate that income. Those business
related costs include the interest paid as return to the creditors. Since these interest expenses reduce
taxable income, they are said to be tax deductible. The return to shareholders or dividends, however,
are included in the taxable base and are taxed. From January 1, 2006 on, Belgian companies or foreign
companies permanently established in Belgium can deduct from their taxable income what is called a
"Risk Capital Deduction", which is an amount computed as the ﬁctious interest cost of the adjusted
equity of a company. Hence, not the actual equity cost, i.e. the return to shareholders, but an estimated
equity cost is tax deductible. From that moment on, however, debt and equity can be considered receiving
the same tax treatment. As both means of ﬁnancing reduce the taxable income of a company, they can
be seen as providing a corporate tax shield.
The main goal of the measure is to promote equity funded activities and to encourage companies to
strengthen their capital structure. Even if the ﬁrst goal of the measure is not to increase investments,
it seeks to maintain earnings in the country, which could later on be used to ﬁnance new investments.
With this measure, policymakers tend to reduce the tax discrimination between debt and equity, but also
to oﬀer an alternative to the abolished special tax regime for coordination centers. The latter regime
granted attractive tax advantages 2 to MNEs’ subsidiaries 3 that oﬀered ﬁnancial and business services to
2Instead of being taxed on its business proﬁts, coordination centres were taxed on 4% to 10% of their business
expenses, which excluded salary and ﬁnancial costs. Moreover, no withholding taxes were levied on dividends,
interests and royalties distributed to group companies. Finally, coordination centres were exempted from property
tax and from registration duties on subscriptions and on increases of capital.
3The status of coordination centre was subject to conditions of size. It was granted only to an entity that is
part of a multinational group with subsidiaries in at least 4 diﬀerent countries. Furthermore, the multinational
group needed to have a total consolidated equity of at least 25 million euro and a total consolidated turnover of
at least 250 million euro. Moreover, the entity was required to have at least 10 employees by the second year of
operations.
2other companies in the group. The regime was gradually withdrawn since it was qualiﬁed as ’unfair tax
competition’ by the European Code of Conduct and considered breaking European State Aid legislation
in 2003. From January 1, 2011 on, coordination centres could no longer beneﬁt from this favourable tax
regime.
The equity taken into account to determine the equity tax shield is the shareholder’s equity, i.e.
the equity hold by external shareholders and adjusted by subtracting certain items to avoid abuse and
double deductions. Starting point of the computation is the equity mentioned in the opening balance
sheet for the taxable period. This equity is adjusted for the net tax value of own shares, of non-portfolio
participations, and of shares issued by investment companies producing taxable revenues. Moreover, the
remaining equity is reduced by the net equity assigned to foreign permanent establishments or real estate
property or rights, by the net book value of tangible ﬁxed assets, which costs do unreasonably exceed
professional needs or which are considered as an investment not acquired in order to produce a regular
income and by tax-free revaluation gains and capital subsidies. Worthwhile noting is that the adjusted
equity consists of both existing and new equity.
The ﬁctious interest rate is determined annually and is equal to the average return of the 10-year
linear state bond of the year two years prior to the tax year concerned. As a result, a company’s equity
will, for corporate tax purposes, be treated as debt with the same annual interest rate as a 10-year
state bond. Moreover, this equity tax shield includes several features to facilitate and encourage its
use. First, the deduction automatically applies to all companies ﬁling a Belgian corporate tax return.
Furthermore, it can be carried forward to the next seven years, no thin capitalization rules apply to
the adjusted equity and no withholding tax is levied on the ﬁctious interest deduction. Finally, no
investment in tangible or intangible assets is required. Except for the latter feature, this equity tax
shield or Allowance for Corporate Equity represents the features of the theoretical tax as developed by
Devereux and Freeman (1991). The new tax law does not require an equity increase to correspond to
the acquisition of a new asset so that the deductible amount can remain stable from one year to another.
The theoretical taxation system, however, supposes the existence of ﬁxed assets depreciated over several
years and assumes therefore a decreasing deductible amount.
As already mentioned, the control companies used in the subsequent empirical analysis are ﬁrms
incorporated in France; a second control group is constructed, containing German companies. Both
France and Germany have a traditional tax system, providing for the tax deductibility of interest expenses
but not of the capital cost of equity.
3 Theoretical Framework
To clarify the impact of the tax neutrality between debt and equity, I develop a simple model showing
how the introduction of an equity tax shield aﬀects the capital structure of a company. Assuming a world
without risk, inﬂation, and taxation, a ﬁrm investing in an asset of value I seeks to maximize its present
value (PV ). Suppose the assets of the ﬁrm are ﬁnanced for a fraction b by debt and a fraction (1 b) by
equity, where b  0. It was under these assumptions that Modigliani and Miller (1958) developed their
major prediction, i.e. that the ﬁnancing mode is irrelevant with respect to the value of the ﬁrm.
Taking into account a traditional corporate tax system, the trade-oﬀ theory of capital structure
(Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), but also Jensen (1976),
Myers (1977)) shows that a ﬁrm’s leverage is determined by the trade-oﬀ between the tax beneﬁts of
debt and the costs of additional ﬁnancial constraints and bankruptcy triggered by an increased leverage.
Leaving bankruptcy costs aside, the subsequent model focuses on the impact of the ﬁnancing mode on
the value of the ﬁrm. It assumes a tax system in which a ﬁrm is taxed on its end-of-period wealth after
deduction of interest expenses and which is based on a constant marginal tax rate (c). Investors are
subject to a constant withholding tax on dividends (d) and on interests (i), where d  0, i  0 and







+ (1   b)
i   d
1   d
I + bcI (1)
where y(I) is an increasing and concave function of investment and stands for the end-of-period earnings
before interest and taxes, and r is the real interest rate and discount rate. In this equation, the ﬁrst
term represents the present value of the taxable base before interest (there is no depreciation allowances
in this model) and the following terms the tax advantage respectively related to equity ﬁnancing and
debt ﬁnancing. The tax advantage of equity is derived from the arbitrage made by the investor between
3debt and equity returns. An investor will acquire shares only if the dividends D he receives are at least
as high as the return he could obtain from an equally risky loan, i.e. (1 d)D  (1 i)rI. As such the
tax advantage of equity can be expressed as (1   b)i d
1 d I. The tax advantage of debt is derived from
the value of debt and expressed as bcI. When maximizing the objective function with respect to debt,






I + cI (2)
It follows from equation (2) that the optimal debt usage is undeﬁned. Assuming then that equation (2)
is strictly positive, as it is the case in Belgium, a company will maximize its debt usage to optimize its
present value. Accordingly, the ﬁnancing mode aﬀects the value of the ﬁrm, since debt is favored for
corporate tax purposes.
When an equity tax shield is introduced into the traditional tax system, the market value of equity
is aﬀected. As for debt, the ﬁrm now also enjoys a tax beneﬁt for equity amounting to the return of an
equally risky loan. Therefore, an additional tax advantage related to equity (1   b)
c(1 d)
1 d I increases
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(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d) + c(1   d)
1   d
I + bcI (3)
Deﬁning leverage as the ratio of total debt to the present value, L = bI
PV , the impact of an equity tax







As total debt and the withholding tax rates are positive, equation (4) is strictly negative. As a result, the
introduction of an equity tax shield encourages companies to lower their debt usage. In order to measure
the extent to which the tax beneﬁts of debt inﬂuence corporate ﬁnancing decisions, this paper is based
on the following implication. Further to equations (2) to (4), when an equity tax shield is introduced,
the tax-favored treatment of debt is reduced and possibly oﬀset, and the capital structure rebalanced,
i.e. the debt usage lowered. Hence, the new capital structure reﬂects the optimal mix of debt and equity
for the company and may be freed of tax interference. The empirically testable prediction can then be
stated as follows:
Prediction: Further to equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity, a company lowers its debt ratio.
Consequently, it is expected to observe a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the tax reform on the leverage
of treated companies. I test this prediction empirically in the following sections.
4 Empirical Methodology
Ideally, the impact of a tax reform is assessed by using a random experiment. Random assignment of
ﬁrms to a policy change, would allow controlling for all relevant (observable and unobservable) covariates,
aﬀecting the outcome of interest. Moreover, in such a random setting no outcomes are favored over others
and selection bias is inexistent. To approach this experimental ideal, a natural experiment needs to be
found to mimic random assignment. Considering the tax reform as an exogenous event, I can, by
determining a treatment and control group, assume the existence of a natural experiment to test the
eﬀect of equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity. Accordingly, the fact of being subject to the tax
reform is the treatment, the treatment group comprising the companies established in the experimental
country, the control group including the companies established in a non-experimental country. Because
pre- and post-reform data are available, I can use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy. This
panel data technique consists in comparing the years before and after the adoption of the tax reform for
both treated and control groups. Estimating the impact of the tax reform through such a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences strategy, however, is only possible if two key assumptions hold. The ﬁrst assumption requires
that capital structure trends before the introduction of the tax reform are similar in both groups. Hence,
treatment and control groups should present the same trend over time in the absence of treatment.
4Therefore, country and time ﬁxed eﬀects have to be controlled for. The second assumption requires
treatment and control groups to have exactly the same pre-treatment characteristics. As a result, the
only relevant diﬀerence between the two groups would be their access to the equity tax shield. Their
diﬀerence in outcome would then be entirely attributable to the tax reform. Thus, the validity of the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology depends on whether the experience of the control group accurately
represents how the treatment group would have done in the absence of the tax reform. Before applying
this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, I need to control whether the two basic assumptions are veriﬁed.
I investigate the equal pre-treatment trend assumption by analyzing graphically how the capital
structure of companies evolves over time in the treatment and the control group. To make sure that the
assumption of equal pre-treatment characteristics holds, I use a propensity score method to match the
treatment and control groups. By stratifying each covariate and pairing a treatment ﬁrm and a control
ﬁrm when they fall in the same category for each covariate, matching balances the observed covariates
between treatment and control groups. As a result, a selection of the control group (counterfactual) is
made which is similar to the treated group in all pre-treatment features and the second assumption is
thus veriﬁed. To ease matching when the number of covariates is large, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
suggested to use a propensity score p(X), summarizing all the observable ﬁrm characteristics into a single
index. This propensity score or conditional probability that ﬁrm i with observable characteristics Xi is
subject to the equity tax shield ACEi is a scalar function of covariates expressed as:
p(X)  E[ACEijXi] = Prob[ACEi = 1jXi] (5)
Consequently, this evaluation technique commonly used in policy analysis, makes it suﬃcient to compare
ﬁrms with similar propensity scores instead of comparing ﬁrms with identical observable characteristics
Xi.
Once a satisfying control group is selected, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model can be set up. Let Cc
(or Country) be a ﬁxed country eﬀect dummy (equal to one if an experimental country, equal to zero if
a non-experimental country), Tt (or Time) be a ﬁxed year eﬀect dummy (equal to one if after the tax
reform, equal to zero if before the tax reform) and Xict be the individual controls. The leverage of a
company i in country c at time t can be estimated by using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
analysis, which takes the following speciﬁcation for a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation:
Yict =  +  Cc + Tt +  Xict + Cc  Tt + ict (6)
where  are time-invariant country eﬀects,  are country-invariant time eﬀects and  is the causal eﬀect
of interest. The coeﬃcient  captures the variation in the outcome of interest in the experimental country
(relative to the non-experimental country) in the years after the tax reform (relative to the years before
the tax reform). Hence, it measures the marginal diﬀerence between the pre and post period with respect
to the introduction of an equity tax shield and determines the economic importance of this diﬀerence.
5 Data
The AMADEUS database (Bureau van Dijk) comprises balance sheet and income statement information
on public and private companies in 41 European countries. The database version used contains data for
15 million companies from the year 2001 on. These companies are non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and the eﬀects on
the ﬁnancial sector will therefore not be treated in the subsequent analysis. The standard format used
to register the information, allows to compare cross-border ﬁnancial data easily. Analyzing a 2006 tax
reform in Belgium, I select a sample of Belgian and French companies active during at least one year in
the time period 2001-2007, as such constructing an unbalanced panel of company data. In this sample,
Belgian ﬁrms are considered the treatment companies; French ﬁrms the control companies. The data
related to the period 2001-2005 are the pre-treatment data; those related to the period 2006-2007 the
post-treatment data. Data for one particular company in one particular year constitute the observational
unit. As in previous capital structure literature, the sample is limited to companies which are active
in the industrial sector (SIC code 2000-5999), excluding the real estate industry, ﬁnancial services, the
public and primary sector. Outliers are controlled for by deleting observations if the book value of ﬁxed
assets or of total debt is more than 100% or less than 0% of total assets, leaving me with a sample of
18,322 Belgian and 91,814 French company-year observations. For robustness purposes, I construct a
sample of Belgian and German companies, in the same way as I did for the sample containing Belgian and
French data. The second sample includes, in addition to the 18,322 Belgian company-year observations,
532,931 German ones. It appears, however, that this sample contains only part of the German companies.
This is due to the compliance rate of ﬁling national accounts at the national bank, which is almost 100%
in Belgium, 65% in France, and only 3% in Germany. Those highly diﬀering compliance rates are due
to the diﬀerent type of data providers: private rating agencies in Germany and public institutions in
Belgium and France.
The data collected are used to construct the capital structure measure and the control variables
needed for the empirical analysis. Working with unconsolidated ﬁnancial account information of both
listed and non-listed companies, I use book values to construct the variables. This is also the case for the
dependent variable, for which I use two diﬀerent deﬁnitions. First, I deﬁne leverage as is done commonly
in the capital structure literature (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham and Harvey (2001), Ortiz-Molina
(2007)). What is called ’book leverage’ is measured as the ratio of total non-equity liabilities to total
assets. Total non-equity liabilities or total debt is the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities. As
the purpose of this paper is related to the tax advantage of debt, I use in a second set of regressions
ﬁnancial leverage as dependent variable, given that only interest related to ﬁnancial debt is tax deductible.
Financial leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of ﬁnancial debt, i.e. long term debt and loans, to total assets
(Rajan and Zingales (1995)). According to the capital structure literature (a.o. Bradley, Jarrell and
Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991)), the main
covariates of the model include tangibility, ﬁrm size, and proﬁtability. Tangibility is deﬁned as the
book value of tangible ﬁxed assets over the book value of total assets. Firm size is measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets. Proﬁtability is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of total assets. The industry dummy
variables are based on two-digit SIC codes. Inﬂation is the annual percentage of inﬂation in consumer
prices as measured by the World Bank. GDP Growth is the annual percentage of GDP per capita growth
as measured by this same institution.
5.1 Summary Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in Table 1. The table provides means and standard
deviations for the main variables used in the analysis, as well as for some additional ﬁrm characteristics.
These statistics are given for the full sample, the treatment and the control group.
As mentioned above, the use of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology is conditioned by two assump-
tions. The ﬁrst condition states that during the pre-reform period, the debt ratio of the treatment and
the control group follow a common trend. In order to determine whether the equal pre-treatment trend
assumption is veriﬁed, graphical analysis is used to study the annual evolution of leverage. In Figure 1, I
plot the average leverage of both groups for the time period 2001-2007. The ﬁgure shows that disregard-
ing the 2005 treatment data, which could be aﬀected by an announcement eﬀect, the average leverage
of the treatment and control groups before the 2006 tax reform follow a similar trend. From 2005 on,
the leverage of Belgian companies decreases, whereas the leverage of control companies increases. This
relative decline in the treatment group provides signiﬁcant evidence that the introduction of an equity
tax shield in Belgium has aﬀected the capital structure trend.
The second assumption on which the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy is based, is that
treatment and control groups have the same characteristics in the absence of the treatment, i.e. the equity
tax shield. In order to verify this assumption, Table 1 compares the characteristics of the treatment and
control companies for the pre-treatment year 2004, reporting the diﬀerences in means of both groups for
balance sheet and proﬁt and loss items. Table 1 describes the statistics for the Belgian and French data.
Those summary statistics show that the comparison group diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the treatment group
with respect to several characteristics. Regarding their proﬁle, companies in the control group tend to
have signiﬁcantly more employees (252 versus 193). As to the balance sheet structure of the companies,
Table 1 shows that there are highly signiﬁcant diﬀerences between treatment and control companies.
Firms in the treatment country have a smaller amount of total assets (46 million versus 51 million),
which is not surprising as France is a larger economic player than Belgium. Likewise, the leverage of
treatment companies (63%) is systematically larger than the leverage of control companies (58%) and
hence the latter have a more balanced capital structure than the former. As regards the proﬁt and loss
account, I observe that treatment companies tend to generate less sales (65 million versus 78 million)
than control companies. All those highly signiﬁcant diﬀerences justify the use of a matching method to






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Figure 1: Evolution of the Leverage Trend over Time
The ﬁgure plots the annual mean leverage of both the treatment and the control group
before matching for the time period 2001-2007. The use of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
strategy requires the treatment and control group to follow a common trend during
the pre-treatment period. Hence, treatment and control groups should present the
same trend over time in the absence of treatment.
5.2 Matching Treatment and Control Observations
Because treatment and control companies need to have identical characteristics in the absence of treat-
ment, a reorganization of the control group is made in an attempt to make the control observations
similar to the treatment observations, except for the treatment. This reorganization is called ’matching’.
To this end, the covariates are balanced between the two groups of observations based on pre-treatment
sample data. 2004 observations were preferred to 2005 data as basis to perform this balance in that the
latter could be aﬀected by the tax reform announcement. Three steps are used to adequately adjust the
control group and to make it comparable to the treatment group.
First, I construct a tool to compare the two groups, i.e. the propensity score or the estimated
probability of being subject to the treatment, given observable characteristics. The propensity score is
estimated, using a probit model which limits the predicted probabilities to the [0,1] interval and which is
based on variables that potentially determine leverage. Hence, the control variables include tangibility,
ﬁrm size, proﬁtability, and industry, as well as dummies reﬂecting whether the company is publicly listed
and whether it is loss-making. For each of the observations, the propensity score thus summarizes all
the information of the control variables into a single index. Estimation results are presented in Table 2.
A second step consists in assessing the overlap of the two groups in terms of propensity score, which
is done visually by checking the region of common support (Figure 2). The boxplots in Figure 2 represent
the propensity score distributions of the treatment and control groups and provide a comparability check
of those groups. Although it cannot be ascertained that a control observation can be found for every
treatment observation, the overlap of the boxplots (i.e. the area between the whiskers) seems important
enough to match the treatment and the control observations.
In a third and last step, treatment and control companies are paired up according to their propensity
score. Because the probability of ﬁnding a control and treatment company with an identical propensity
score is very small, an algorithm is used to ﬁnd the best ﬁtting match. Here, a nearest neighbor algorithm
is selected, matching each treatment observation with the closest control observation as regards propen-
sity score. This algorithm allows to match one control observation with several treatment observations.
Because the control group is larger than the treatment group, the control observations which are not
matched with a treatment observation are dropped. As shown by Table 3, matching allows to largely
reduce the diﬀerences between the treatment and the control group and consequently, to make the groups
more comparable. The ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 present the means and means diﬀerences between
the treatment and the control group before matching; the last three columns of Table 3 show the means
and mean diﬀerences after matching. The mean diﬀerences between the groups, which are statistically
8Table 2: Probit for the Probability of Treatment
The table presents the probit estimation results of the propensity to be subject to
the equity tax shield. Firm characteristics, inﬂuencing the capital structure of com-
panies, are used to estimate the model. The dependent variable takes value one if
the company is subject to the tax reform, zero otherwise. The estimation is based
on pre-treatment data, i.e. 2004 observations. , , and    denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.










diﬀerent from zero in the unmatched sample become statistically equal to zero in the matched sample,
indicating that the adjusted control group now closely resembles the treatment group.
The control group adjusted, an average treatment eﬀect can be estimated. Having both pre- and
post-treatment data and given a treatment and control group with similar pre-treatment trend and
characteristics, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy can be setup, allowing to control for country and time
eﬀects. The latter are measured by the variables Country and Time. Country is a dummy variable that
takes one if the company is located in an experimental country, zero otherwise. This variable captures the
country-speciﬁcities of leverage. Time is a dummy variable that takes one if the company observation
is done after the tax reform, zero otherwise. This variable captures the time-speciﬁcities of leverage.
Both variables are proper to the implementation of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation. The variation
in leverage due to the tax reform is captured through the dummy variable ACE, that takes one if the
company is located in an experimental country and if the observation is done after the tax reform, zero
otherwise.
6 Results
A ﬁrst subsection reports the basic regressions testing the impact of an equity tax shield on the capital
structure of companies. Then, the robustness of these results is checked by using raw unmatched data
and by using an additional control group. Third, the consistency of the results with the ﬁnancial
constraint theory is veriﬁed, by making the same analysis after splitting the sample into small and
medium enterprises (SME) and large companies. Finally, policy implications are discussed.
6.1 Impact of Taxation on a Company’s Capital Structure
Table 4 reports the basic regression estimations, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy after having
matched treatment and control companies. Both coeﬃcients and standard errors are reported. Standard
errors are robust for ﬁrm speciﬁc clustering. As mentioned above, two measures of leverage are used, i.e.
book leverage and ﬁnancial leverage. Book leverage is measured as the ratio of the book value of total
debt to the book value of total assets. Financial leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of ﬁnancial debt, i.e.
long term debt and loans, to total assets.
Regressions (1) to (4) of Table 4 use book leverage as dependent variable. Regression (1) regresses the
outcome variable on a country-speciﬁc dummy, a time-speciﬁc dummy, a dummy reﬂecting the existence
of the tax reform, tangibility, proﬁtability, ﬁrm size, and industry. In this basic regression, the variable
of interest ACE has an estimated negative coeﬃcient of -0.071 and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This
result is consistent with the theoretical prediction that taxation has an eﬀect on the capital structure of
companies, given that introducing an equity tax shield lowers the debt usage. It suggests that adopting


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10Figure 2: Boxplots of the Estimated Propensity Score
The ﬁgure shows boxplots of the propensity score distributions of the treatment and
control groups after balancing the covariates. For each distribution, the lower and
upper quartiles (25th and 75th percentiles) form the bottom and top of the box.
The horizontal line within the box indicates the median (50th percentile) and the
ends of the whiskers represent the maximum and minimum of the sub-sample. The
observations lying outside the whiskers are considered outliers. The boxplots provide
a comparability check for the treatment and control group in terms of observable
characteristics. The overlap in the distributions (area between the whiskers) indicates
how well a matching strategy can be implemented. The wider the overlap, the better
treatment observations and control observations can be matched.
than 7%. The coeﬃcient on Country, returning one if the observation is related to a company located
in the treatment country, is positive (0.076) and highly signiﬁcant (1% level). This suggests that in the
absence of the tax reform, there are substantial country-speciﬁc eﬀects determining the book leverage of
a company. The same is true with respect to time eﬀects. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (0.034)
on Time, returning one if the observation is post-reform, indicates that the time period is an important
factor explaining the leverage of a company. However, with respect to the control variables, only the
impact of proﬁtability is consistent with the theoretical predictions. Previous capital structure research
(Rajan and Zingales (1995)) ﬁnds that leverage decreases with proﬁtability, since ﬁnancing with retained
earnings is prefered over debt ﬁnancing for proﬁtability purposes. Contrary to what theory predicts,
tangibility and ﬁrm size have a negative eﬀect on leverage. The negative impact of ﬁrm size would mean
that size reﬂects the information of outside investors who prefer equity over debt (Rajan and Zingales
(1995)). A possible explanation for the negative impact of tangibility comes from the fact that leverage
may be inﬂuenced more by tax purposes than by ﬁnance purposes as debt and ﬁxed assets both oﬀer tax
deductible expenses (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2008)). Further to
the R2 statistic, this set ofvariables explains 9.9% of the variation in book leverage. Moreover, that both
ﬁrm size and tangibility present a negative relationship instead of an expected positive one, suggests a
missing variable bias.
Therefore, regression (2) uses the same speciﬁcation as regression (1) but adds a non-debt tax shield
variable, i.e. Net Operating Loss (NOL) to the control variables. Net Operating Loss is a dummy
variable that takes one if the company is loss-making, zero otherwise. Hence, it proxies the presence of
tax losses carry forward, which oﬀer the possibility to oﬀset taxable proﬁts. The coeﬃcient of the NOL
variable (0.059) is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The R2 statistic (0.1087), however, did not increase much
and the coeﬃcients of ﬁrm size and tangibility remain negative.
Regression (3) uses the same speciﬁcation as regression (1) but adds the variable Non-Debt Tax
Shield (NDTS), deﬁned as the ratio of depreciation costs over total assets. This additional variable could
indicate whether the negative coeﬃcient of tangibility might be explained by the tax shield related to
depreciation. Although the coeﬃcient of NDTS (0.599) is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, it does not change
11Table 4: Impact of Taxation on a Company’s Capital Structure
The table reports the leverage regression estimations, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy for Belgian and French
data. The regressions are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Two dependent variables are used. Book leverage
is measured as the ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets. Financial leverage is the ratio of ﬁnancial debt to
the book value of total assets. Country is a dummy variable that takes one if the company is located in an experimental
country, zero otherwise. Time is a dummy variable that takes one if the company observation is done after the tax
reform, zero otherwise. ACE is a dummy variable that takes one if the company is located in an experimental country
and if the observation is done after the tax reform, zero otherwise. Tangibility is deﬁned as the book value of tangible
ﬁxed assets over the book value of total assets. Proﬁtability is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization to the book value of total assets. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total
assets. Net Operating Loss is a dummy variable that takes one if the company is loss-making, zero otherwise. Non-Debt
Tax Shield is deﬁned as the ratio of depreciation costs over total assets. Inﬂation is the annual percentage of inﬂation in
consumer prices as measured by the World Bank. GDP Growth is the annual percentage of GDP per capita growth as
measured by the World Bank. The industry dummy variables are based on two-digit SIC codes. Both coeﬃcients and
standard errors are reported. Standard errors are robust for ﬁrm speciﬁc clustering. , , and    denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Dependent Variable Book Leverage Financial Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country 0.076 0.074 0.035 0.037 0.105 0.098 0.100
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Time 0.034 0.036 0.033 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.027
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ACE (-) -0.071 -0.069 -0.062 -0.062 -0.047 -0.046 -0.043
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tangibility (+) -0.075 -0.093 -0.121 -0.121 0.199 0.194 0.194
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Proﬁtability (-) -0.209 -0.122 -0.271 -0.270 -0.163 -0.173 -0.173
(0.024) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Firm Size (+) -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Net Operating Loss (NOL) - 0.059 - - - - -
(0.004)
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) - - 0.599 0.597 - 0.103 0.098
(0.066) (0.066) (0.0053) (0.053)
Inﬂation (-) - - - -0.007 - - -0.004
(0.002) (0.002)
GDP Growth (+) - - - 0.000 - - -0.005
(0.001) (0.001)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 86,931 86,931 86,135 86,135 86,931 86,135 86,135
R2 0.0986 0.1087 0.1157 0.1158 0.1124 0.1125 0.1127
12the direction in which tangibility aﬀects book leverage. The economic signiﬁcance of the variable of
interest ACE is slightly altered, as introducing an equity tax shield now lowers a company’s leverage on
average with 6% instead of 7%. Adding the NDTS variable, however, improved the goodness of ﬁt of the
model. The R2 statistic indicates that the model now explains 11.6% of the leverage variation.
This same estimation of 6% is found when some macroeconomic variables, which allow to control for
major economic diﬀerences between the treatment and the control group, are introduced (regression (4)).
As suggested by Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2008), inﬂation may lead to higher risk premiums and
nominal interest rates, which discourages the use of debt. Hence, Inﬂation is expected to be negatively
related to leverage. GDP Growth proxies the growth opportunities of a company. As a company with
high hopes for future growth will need to invest, GDP Growth is expected to be positively related to
leverage (Frank and Goyal (2004)). In regression (4) Inﬂation has a statistically signiﬁcant impact (1%
level) of -0.007 on the debt ratio, GDP Growth has no eﬀect.
Regressions (5) to (7) use ﬁnancial leverage as endogenous variable. Regression (5) shows that the
estimated ACE coeﬃcient is lower using this leverage measure compared with using the book leverage as
dependent variable (-0.047 versus -0.071). The coeﬃcient of the ACE variable remains highly signiﬁcant
(1% level). This indicates that, following the introduction of the equity tax shield, companies also
decreased their trade debt and not only their ﬁnancial debt which generate tax deductible interests.
Moreover, the impacts of tangibility and ﬁrm size are now consistent with the theoretical predictions.
As in previous capital structure research (Rajan and Zingales (1995)) leverage increases with tangibility,
since ﬁxed assets serve as debt collateral, and with ﬁrm size, since large ﬁrms can more easily contract for
credits. As book leverage, ﬁnancial leverage decreases with proﬁtability. All three estimated coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The R2 statistic shows that 11.2% of the ﬁnancial leverage variation is
explained by this set of variables.
Regression (6) of Table 4 again includes the Non-Debt Tax Shield variable. Once more the estimated
ACE coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant, both from a statistical (1% level) as from an economic point of view
(-0.046).
Regression (7) adds the macroeconomic variables Inﬂation and GDP Growth. Both variables have a
negative impact on the ﬁnancial leverage of a company. This impact is statistically signiﬁcant (5% and
1% respectively). The estimated coeﬃcient of the variable of interest is in line with what was found for
regression (6).
Whether for book leverage or for ﬁnancial leverage, all speciﬁcations report a quite unanimous
evaluation of the tax reform with respect to capital structure. The introduction of an equity tax shield
signiﬁcantly lowers the use of debt, which economically amounts to a decrease of leverage of 4-7%. These
results provide strong evidence that taxes do aﬀect corporate ﬁnancing decisions.
6.2 Robustness
In order to verify the robustness of the results, two additional sets of regressions are generated. First,
I produce the results for unmatched data, in view of excluding the hypothesis that matching may have
altered the regression outcomes. Second, I generate the results for an additional control group, to assess
whether the results are not country-speciﬁc. German companies constitute the additional control group.
Table 5 reports the results of the robustness tests.
Regressions (1) to (6) of Table 5 use book leverage as endogenous variable. In order to control whether
matching may have altered the estimations, regressions (1) to (3) use unmatched data for Belgium and
France. I ﬁnd very similar, almost identical, results compared to the basic results of regression (1) of
Table 4, both for the coeﬃcients of the dependent variable as for the coeﬃcients of the control variables.
This same analysis can be made with respect to regressions (2) and (3). Regression (2) adds the Non-
Debt Tax Shield variable. Regression (3) completes with the macroeconomic variables Inﬂation and GDP
Growth. As with regression (1), I obtain almost identical results without matching as with matching,
which suggests the robustness of the results.
Using German companies as control units, instead of French ﬁrms, and book leverage as dependent
variable, I ﬁnd ACE coeﬃcients which are weaker than those for the French control group. Regressions
(4) to (6) show ACE coeﬃcients of approximately -0.020, whereas identical speciﬁcations for the French
control group provide ACE coeﬃcients of approximately -0.060. All the results are still highly signiﬁcant
(1% level). Regarding the coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables, I observe that, consistent with the
theoretical predictions, tangibility has a positive eﬀect on leverage and proﬁtability a negative one. Firm
size, on the contrary, inﬂuences leverage negatively. As mentioned above, size would in this case reﬂect
the information of outside investors who prefer equity over debt (Rajan and Zingales (1995)).
13Table 5: Robustness
The table reports the leverage regression estimations, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy to test the robustness of
the results. The regressions are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The dependent variable, Book leverage,
is measured as the ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets. Total debt is the sum of the book value of
long-term debt and of current liabilities. Regressions (1) to (3) are based on unmatched data; regressions (4) to (6) are
based on Belgian-German data. Country is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the company is located in an experimental
country, zero otherwise. Time is a dummy variable that takes one if the company observation is done after the tax
reform, zero otherwise. ACE is a dummy variable that takes one if the company is located in an experimental country
and if the observation is done after the tax reform, zero otherwise. Tangibility is deﬁned as the book value of tangible
ﬁxed assets over the book value of total assets. Proﬁtability is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization to the book value of total assets. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of
total assets. Non-Debt Tax Shield is deﬁned as the ratio of depreciation costs over total assets. Inﬂation is the annual
percentage of inﬂation in consumer prices as measured by the World Bank. GDP Growth is the annual percentage of
GDP per capita growth as measured by the World Bank. The industry dummy variables are based on two-digit SIC
codes. Both coeﬃcients and standard errors are reported. Standard errors are robust for ﬁrm speciﬁc clustering. , ,
and    denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Dependent Variable Book Leverage
Unmatched Data Belgian-German Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country 0.073 0.029 0.031 0.081 0.080 0.089
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Time 0.036 0.033 0.029 -0.018 -0.018 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
ACE (-) -0.074 -0.061 -0.061 -0.018 -0.018 -0.026
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Tangibility (+) -0.116 -0.160 -0.160 0.055 0.057 0.058
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Proﬁtability (-) -0.197 -0.280 -0.280 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm Size (+) -0.005 -0.015 -0.015 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) - 0.680 0.677 - -0.013 -0.019
(0.065) (0.065) (0.0065) (0.065)
Inﬂation (-) - - -0.011 - - -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
GDP Growth (+) - - 0.000 - - -0.007
(0.001) (0.001)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 106,685 104,603 104,603 54,273 53,307 53,307
R2 0.0972 0.1267 0.1268 0.1042 0.1025 0.1028
14Overall, the robustness tests are conclusive, as neither the matching of treated and control companies,
nor the use of a diﬀerent control group, statistically alters the baseline results. From an economic point of
view, though, it might be considered that the impact of the introduction of an equity tax shield amounts
to approximately 2-7% rather than 4-7%.
6.3 Impact on Small and Medium Enterprises versus Large Companies
To determine which type of companies experience the highest impact from the introduction of an Al-
lowance for Corporate Equity, the sample is split into two subsamples: small and medium enterprises
(SME) and large companies. This split-up is done based on the SME deﬁnition of the European Com-
mission. Small and medium sized enterprises are deﬁned as those having less than 250 employees and
total assets which do not exceed EUR 43 million. Large companies are deﬁned as those exceeding one
of those thresholds. The results of Table 6 show how the equity tax shield diﬀerently aﬀects SMEs and
large ﬁrms with respect to ﬁnancial leverage.
Regressions (1) to (3) of Table 6 use the SME subsample; regressions (4) to (6) of Table 6 use the
large company subsample. Comparing the ACE coeﬃcients of the former with those of the latter, I
observe that the impact of the tax reform on large companies has been slightly more substantial than
the impact on SMEs. SMEs reduced their debt ratio with approximately 4.6%, whereas large companies
lowered their leverage with approximately 4.9%. Furthermore, all results are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. These results are consistent with the ﬁnancial constraint theory (a.o. Erickson and Whited
(2000), Almeida and Campello (2007)), predicting that small ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially constrained than
large comapnies. Small ﬁrms are often younger and face more important credit constraints than large
ﬁrms. Hence, they cannot be as reactive to equity incentives as larger ﬁrms. According to this theory
it is therefore not surprising to observe a higher leverage decrease for large ﬁrms than for small and
medium ﬁrms following the introduction of an equity tax shield (ACE variable). The R2 statistic of the
speciﬁcations indicates that the model better ﬁts the large company data than the SME data.
6.4 Policy implications
As aforementioned, the introduction of an Allowance for Corporate Equity in Belgium actually served two
goals. The oﬃcial goal was to make capital structure decisions more tax-neutral. The results obtained
according to the above estimations clearly show that companies adjusted their debt policy and balanced
their capital structure further to the ACE introduction. I found that the ACE system encouraged
companies to decrease their leverage by approximately 2 to 7%. Based on these results, it can be
ascertained that the measure had the requested eﬀect. The unoﬃcial goal of the ACE system was to
oﬀer an alternative to the abolished special tax regime for coordination centers. Hence, it was intended
to hold back multinational companies which established a coordination center in Belgium by oﬀering
them an equivalent tax advantage. The results found show that the tax reform has a more substantial
impact on large companies than on small and medium enterprises. This provides some evidence that the
Belgian government continues to favor MNEs.
The tax favor granted to MNEs is one of the reasons why the ACE measure has been criticised. From
a theoretical point of view, similar results could probably be obtained by using a Comprehensive Business
Income Tax (CBIT), disallowing the tax deduction of interest payments on debt. For a small economy,
however, the latter system is not feasible as long as surrounding countries do not introduce a similar
measure. The introduction of a CBIT system in a single country would potentially drain companies
away. This argument leads to the idea of a combined ACE-CBIT system, which would grant partial but
equal tax deductibility for the costs of both ﬁnancing modes.
Another common criticism of the ACE system is related to its considerable cost for the Belgian public
ﬁnances. Since the foregone tax revenues do not seem to boost the economy or serve any employment
objective, the credibility of the measure is somewhat undermined in the eyes of the public. A simple
analysis of the impact of the equity tax shield on investment does not provide signiﬁcant results. Table
7 reports the results of regressing the investment ratio (i.e. investment over capital stock as deﬁned in
Eisner and Strotz (1963)) on country, time and ACE dummies as well as on sales growth, the debt ratio
and the cash ﬂow ratio. As none of the ACE coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, no clear-cut impact
of ACE on investment can be determined. This is not surprising given that both new and old equity are
used to compute the tax advantage. Hence, a company does not need to generate new investments to
beneﬁt from the tax reform. From a policy point of view this could be a painful aspect, especially in the
aftermath of the crisis guided by ﬁscal consolidation.
15Table 6: Small and Medium Enterprises versus Large Companies
The table reports leverage regression estimations, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy, to compare the impact on
small and medium enterprises versus large companies. The regressions are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
The dependent variable, Financial Leverage, is the ratio of ﬁnancial debt to the book value of total assets. Country
is a dummy variable that takes one if the company is located in an experimental country, zero otherwise. Time is a
dummy variable that takes one if the company observation is done after the tax reform, zero otherwise. ACE is a dummy
variable that takes one if the company is located in an experimental country and if the observation is done after the
tax reform, zero otherwise. Tangibility is deﬁned as the book value of tangible ﬁxed assets over the book value of total
assets. Proﬁtability is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to the
book value of total assets. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Non-Debt Tax Shield is deﬁned
as the ratio of depreciation costs over total assets. Inﬂation is the annual percentage of inﬂation in consumer prices as
measured by the World Bank. GDP Growth is the annual percentage of GDP per capita growth as measured by the
World Bank. The industry dummy variables are based on two-digit SIC codes. Both coeﬃcients and standard errors are
reported. , , and    denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Dependent Variable Financial Leverage
Small and Medium Enterprises Large Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country 0.092 0.082 0.083 0.149 0.148 0.150
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
Time 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.017 0.016 0.017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
ACE (-) -0.048 -0.047 -0.044 -0.051 -0.050 -0.046
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Tangibility (+) 0.248 0.240 0.241 0.088 0.087 0.087
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.008) (0.025)
Proﬁtability (-) -0.143 -0.156 -0.156 -0.263 -0.265 -0.264
(0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.008) (0.028)
Firm Size (+) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) - 0.150 0.145 - 0.011 0.004
(0.053) (0.053) (0.186) (0.187)
Inﬂation (-) - - -0.003 - - -0.009
(0.002) (0.006)
GDP Growth (+) - - -0.005 - - -0.006
(0.001) (0.003)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 70,871 70,170 70,170 16,072 15,970 15,975
R2 0.1096 0.1104 0.1107 0.1696 0.1689 0.1695
16Table 7: Impact of an Equity Tax Shield on Investment
The table reports investment regression estimations, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
strategy. The regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. The dependent
variable is the ratio of investment over capital stock. Country is a dummy variable
that takes one if the company is located in an experimental country, zero otherwise.
Time is a dummy variable that takes one if the company observation is done after the
tax reform, zero otherwise. ACE is a dummy variable that takes one if the company is
located in an experimental country and if the observation is done after the tax reform,
zero otherwise. Sales Growth t-1 is the ratio of the change in sales over shareholder
funds for the previous year. Cash ﬂow ratio t is the ratio of cash ﬂow over shareholder
funds. Debt ratio t-1 is the ratio of total debt over shareholder funds for the previous
year. Both coeﬃcients and standard errors are reported. , , and    denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Dependent Variable Investment Ratio
Full Sample SME Large Companies
Country 0.751 -0.224 1.634
(0.692) (0.189) (2.282)
Time -0.364 -0.047 -1.693
(0.454) (0.085) (1.007)
ACE 0.610 1.094 -0.772
(1.104) (3.430) (2.113)
Sales Growth t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Flow Ratio t -0.268 -0.358 0.057
(0.006) (0.165) (0.063)
Debt Ratio t-1 -0.008 0.103 0.051
(0.001) (0.061) (0.013)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 32,451 25,837 6,614
R2 0.1894 0.2511 0.3019
177 Conclusion and further research tracks
The debate on how taxes aﬀect corporate ﬁnancing decisions was after decades of research still not
settled. This paper contributes to this debate by providing strong evidence of the impact of taxation on
corporate debt policy. It proposes a new approach to the issue by taking advantage of a 2006 tax reform
in Belgium introducing an equity tax shield. Such an equity tax shield or Allowance for Corporate Equity
attributes a similar tax deductibility to the return on equity as to interest expenses. Hence, it sets an
end to the tax discrimination between debt and equity. Examining the extent to which the removal of
this tax discrimination impacts a company’s capital structure, goes back to the core of the corporate tax
distortion debate and oﬀers therefore a unique opportunity to settle the issue.
To clarify the impact of the tax neutrality between debt and equity, I developed a simple model
showing how the introduction of an equity tax shield aﬀects the capital structure of a company. The
model predicts that following the introduction of an equal tax treatment of debt and equity, companies
lower their debt ratio. This prediction is evaluated quantitatively through the use of a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy comparing the capital structure of treatment and control companies
before and after the tax reform. Hence, the sample consists of pre-treatment (2001-2005) and post-
treatment (2006-2007) data for Belgian (treatment) and French (control) companies. In order to ascertain
that the control group is adequate, capital structure trends are analyzed and a propensity score method
is used to match treatment and control ﬁrms.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, the empirical results report a signiﬁcant negative impact
of the reform on the leverage of companies subject to the equity tax shield. I found that the estimated
impact is highly signiﬁcant and that it amounts economically to a leverage decrease of approximately 2-
7%, meaning that a traditional tax system encourages companies to use on average 2-7% more debt than
when there is an equal tax treatment of debt and equity. Further extension of the analysis reveals that
large companies experience a higher eﬀect from the equity tax shield than small and medium companies.
Having established a strong relation between taxation and debt policy, it would be interesting to
study the channels through which the ACE system aﬀects a company’s leverage. To explore these
channels, additional data related to dividends and retained earnings should be collected, as they are not
available in the current database. Moreover, in order to control for the potential eﬀect of the former
coordination center regime, it would be useful to identify those companies in the sample which beneﬁted
from the regime during the period 2001-2007. A relevant research track would also be to expand the
analysis to the impact of the tax reform on the debt level of a company. This would allow to measure
the eﬀect of the treatment in absolute terms rather than in relative terms. Furthermore, in the wake of
the ﬁnancial crisis, it would be interesting to study the impact of the tax discrimination between debt
and equity on the banking sector.
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